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ARTICLE
ARTICLE�
An Ecological Argument for Vegetarianism
1. To the prudential, humanitarian,
utilitarian, and deontological argu
ments for vegetarianism, I would like
to add an ecological argument. 1 I will
suppose, for the sake of argument,
that healthy ecosystems are of value,
that the value of an ecosystem is
positively related to its degree of
health, and that at least part of this
value is independent of the interests
of human and other sentient beings.
This is not to deny that human inter
ests and sentient experiences have
value, but to affirm that the value of
a healthy ecosystem does not rest
entirely upon these other values.
The following argument is thus
hypothetical in form.
If one accepts
the independent value of healthy eco
systems, then one must accept the
prescription to become a vegetarian.
The
antecedent
is
controversial.
Kantians and hedonistic utilitarians
will not accord the required value to
ecosystems, whereas W. D. Ross's
formali.sm and G. E. Moore's idealistic
util ita ri ani sm are compati ble with th is
value. Rather than repeat the argu
ments here, I refer the reader to the
appropriate literature 2 and move on to
the vegetarian implications of believi ng
that healthy ecosystems are intrinsi
cally good.
The "vegetarian implication" that I
endorse in the present paper is lim
ited, but nonetheless of great practi
cal significance.
Except for those
relatively few people whose health
would be endangered by vegetarian
ism, members of industrial societies
have an absolute duty, as opposed to
a merely prima facie duty, to adopt a
diet th at does not i ncl ude th e meat of
animals that have' been deliberately
raised for food,
nor of animals

acq u ired th roug h the h unti ng methods
employed almost universally in indus
trial societies. This would be a diet
without
MacDonald's
hambu rgers,
without ground meat, or steak or
chicken or pork from the grocery
store,
without
Kentucky
Fried
Chicken, and without pepperoni or
sausage or ham on one's pizza, to
mention but a few of the ways in
which the prescribed diet differs from
that of most Americans. The implica
tions of the argument are thus con
siderable.
But the argument falls
short of prescribing anything at all
for some people (traditional hunter
gatherers and those with
special
dietary problems) ,and does not pre
scribe strict vegetarianism for anyone
(because strict vegetarianism excludes
eating even the small quantities of
fish that may be acquired through
ecologically benign fishing).
I n these
respects, the argument is like the
utilitarian argument for vegetarianism.
Yet, as in the case of the utilitarian
argument, the argument presented
here prescribes so
many dieta ry
changes in the direction of vegetari
anism for so many of our society's
omnivores, that it is not unreasonably
labeled an argument for vegetarianism.
2. If healthy ecosystems are of
value, and the value of an ecosystem
is positively related to its health,
then, according to both ethical theo
ries that are compatible with this
value, one has a moral reason to avoid
needlessly impairing the health of any
ecosystem.
To do so is to diminish
the good, which runs afoul of both
the formalist duty of nonmaleficence
and the (ideal) utilitarian duty to
maximize the good. The same theories
endorse repairing the damage one has
done
to
an
ecosystem's
health.
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Formalism includes a duty of repara
tion, and repairing damage would, all
other things being equal, maximize the
good.
Further, one ought, when
possible, to promote or improve the
health of ecosystems.
This accords
with both the formalist duty of benef
icence and the utilitarian duty to
maximize the good.
However, the val ue of healthy eco
systems is just one among many val
ues. So on either eth ical theory, the
duties to avoid harming, to repair
damage anq to improve the health of
ecosystems are only prima facie.
They apply when all other things are
equal.
This may suggest to some people
that these duties are overridden
whenever they call for behavior that
the agent fi nds i nconven ient or i rk
some.
But such a view ignores the
distinction between moral and pruden
tial obligations. A moral obligation is
affected by and responsive to consid
erations relating not only to the
agent, but to at least some other
beings as well.
A purely prudential
obi igation, by contrast, is affected by
and
responsive
to
considerations
relating to the agent alone.
The
slightest inconvenience to the agent
could override an obligation only if no
weight is accorded to considerations
relating to others, which is to say,
only if the obligation in question is
prudential rather than moral.
Any
prima facie moral obligation requires
more, if it is to be overridden, than
the slightest inconvenience to the
agent.
Since the obligations
to
refrain from har-ming, to repair harm
done, and to promote the health of
ecosystems are moral obi igations, they
cannot be overridden by the slightest
inconvenience to the agent.
3.
One way that people can
reduce thei r negative impact upon,
and promote the health of ecosystems
is by becoming vegetarians (of the
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sort mentioned ea rl ier) . Less cu Itiva
tion is needed to feed vegetarians
than omnivores because the animals
eaten by omnivores must themselves
be fed by vegetation grown on the
land.
But most of the nutritional
value of this vegetation is used by
the animals for their own bodies'
maintenance.
So people who eat
plants instead of feeding them to ani
mals can feed themselves by growing
fewer plants and cultivating less
land. 3
The cultivation of land is almost
universally detrimental to an ecosys
tem's
health.
One
ecosystem
is
health ier than another if it has a
greater ability to regenerate itself.
I n the words of Aldo Leopold, "Health
is the capacity of the land for self
renewal. "4 The su rface of the Moon
and Parmenides' One are paradigm
cases
of
non -ecosystems.
They
i ncl ude neither generation nor regen
eration.
Central Illinois is typical of
land under cultivation. A few spec
ies, such as huma n bei ngs, corn and
soybeans are overrepresented, while
the general diversity of species is
very small (compared to a wilderness
area). The soil is eroding faster than
it is being built (hence the massive
use of fertilizers) and insect popula
tions tend toward inordinate growth
(hence the massive use of pesticides).
The capacity for self- regeneration is
thus very limited.
Take away the
ferti lizers, pesticides a nd herbicides,
and the fields of corn and soybeans
would change rapidly; they would not
regenerate in their current form
Healthy ecosystems may be com
pared
to
healthy
organisms.
A
healthy plant or animal has the power
to regenerate itself in the context of
the environmental conditions to which
it is adapted by evolution.
By con
trast, an animal that is seriously ill
may require blood transfusions, a
respirator, and other artificial life
support systems if it is to remain
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alive. If it dies, the matter of which
it is composed will continue to exist,
but will no longer participate in the
same system of relationsh ips that
characterized the living organism.
The herbicides, pesticides a nd fer
tilizers used in Central Illinois are
like the' artificial life-support systems
that may be used to keep an animal
alive. Just as the necessity of arti
ficial life support indicates ill health
in an or,ganism, the necessity of pes
ticides and the like indicates ill health
in Central Illinois' agricultural ecosys
terns.
In' both cases, ill health is
indicated by the inability of a system
(or organ ism) to regenerate itself.
Central Illinois would be ecologically
, health ier were it not fa rmed.
The ecologically disruptive impact
of agriculture is not due entirely to
the use of modern agricultu ral meth
ods.
I n the ancient Near East the
emergence of agricultu re caused "the
local extinction of large wild mammals,
deserts replacing forests, the degra
dation of grasslands and the disap
pearance of soil. "5 In the Far East,
as well, ag ricu Itu re accou nts for
eroded slopes su rrounding ancient cit
ies, their burial under successive lay
ers of silt, and periodic floods and
pestilence.
Wilderness
areas
are
almost universally healthier than areas
that are farmed.
Some land is not suitable for grow
ing plants that humans can eat, but
can be used to grow vegetation that
animals can eat.
People can make
nutritional use of this land only by
eating the animals raised upon it.
However, this method of deliberately
raising animals for food also degrades
the ecosystems involved. Th~ herded
species are overrepresented in the
ecosystem just as is corn in central
Illinois.
So are the plant species
upon which the herds feed.
The
general variety of animal species is
reduced
because
predators
are
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eliminated to protect the flock, and
other grazing animals are crowed out
of the limited food supply. The man
made machines used in the process of
controlling and moving the herd are
ecologically disruptive,
and
range
overuse often causes ecological diffi
culties.
The result isa diminished
capacity for self- regeneration.
Just
as a sick individual may need to have
fluids drained from her body in an
artificial manner, so members of the
herded species must be eliminated by
massive human intervention, because
humans are the species' only preda
tors.
If human beings ignore the
flock for a considerable period of
time, over-grazing will denude the
landscape. Rains will then wash away
the topsoil, reducing floral regenera
tion. The herd will starve for lack of
food. They wi II be unable to regen
erate themselves.
In short, theeco
system will die, to be replaced by
another.
A vegetarian population would allow
such land to remain in the ecologically
healthier wilderness state.
Thus,
whether animals are raised for, human
consumption through farming or herd
ing, people could feed themselves in a
less ecologically disruptive manner by
being vegetarians. Their prima facie
obligation to reduce their negative
impact upon and promote the health of
ecosystems thus gives them a prima
facie obligation to be vegetarians.
4. It is true that alfalfa croppi ng
enriches soils ,by adding nitrogen to
them.
Nitrogen enrichment can en
hance an area's generative and re
generative capacities. So one, way of
improving the ecological health of an
area that has nitrogen depleted soil is
to grow alfalfa there before allowing
the area to return to a wilderness
state.
People can make nutritional
use of the resulting alfalfa only by
going through the animal cycle. From
the pu rely ecological perspective meat
should occasionally be raised this way
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and consumed by people. This would
allow some of people's
nutritional
requirements to be met in a way that,
unlike most agricultural production, is
ecologically constructive, rather than
destructive.
The
same
reasoning
supports raising animals for human,
consumption on garbage, the waste
from vegetable processing, and the
like.

itself.
However, ecologically benign
hunting represents an insignificantly
small percentage of the hunting con
ducted world-wide. The small quanti
ties of meat acquired by it should, for
humanitarian and ecological reasons,
be reserved for those with special
medical problems, since alfalfa crop
ping and the like are unlikely to be
sufficient for thei r needs.

But some human beings have spe
cial medical needs for the consumption
of meat and are therefore exempt from
th e CLi rrent a rg ument fo r vegeta ri an
ism. It is assumed that their physical
health is of greater value than is the
ecological disvalue that is typically
caused by eating meat.
Occasional
alfalfa cropping and the like makes it
possible to feed (many of) these peo
ple without any ecological disvalue.
But this does not justify anyone else
eating meat grown deliberately for
human consumption.

An exception should be made in
this regard for some contemporary
hunter-gatherers.
Thei r entl re way
of Iife depends upon the (ecologically
benign) hunt meeting some of their
nutritional needs.
The loss they
would experience by becoming vegeta
rians, like that of people with special
medical problems, is more than can be
justified by the ecological good that
their vegetarianism would do.

There a re, of cou rse, objections to
eating meat that are distinct from the
ecological considerations raised here.
Peter Singer objects to meat consump
tion on utilitarian grounds,6 and Tom
Regan on the basis of an imal rights. 7
Any concessions made in this paper to
the practice of eati ng meat relate
solely to ecological considerations, and
are not meant to imply that the prac
tice is acceptable from the perspec
tives of utilitarianism or animal rights.
I am here considering the implications
on Iy of the ecological perspective.

I
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Some meat is available from animals
that have not been del iberately raised
for human consumption.
These are
animals that have grown in the wild.
They can be acqui red th rough ecolog
ically benign hunting, such as that
undertaken by many hunter-gather
ers, and by such hunting advocates
as Aldo Leopold and Paul Shepard.
Such hu nting is ecologically ben ign
because it does not detract from the
ecosystem's
ability
to
regenerate

Some fishing could be ecologically
benign and result in large catches,
though at present little fishing is
conducted in this manner.
But if a
great deal were, healthy people would
be able to eat some fish, but probably
much less than at present.
(Again,
this is the case when the issue is
viewed solely from the ecological per
spective. )
5. Some people might be surprised
to learn that vegetarianism is ecologi
cally better than omnivorous eating,
because they thin k that if everyone
became a vegeta ria n, the world wou Id
be populated by increasing hordes of
cows, hogs and chickens, who would
plague humanity and cause ecological
disaster. However, this fear is ill
fou nded.
,Fa rmers cu rrently control
the size of their flocks and so would
be able to reduce them appropriately
as the demand for meat diminished.
But most species need not become
extinct, either.
Some of thei r mem
bers could probably be returned to
suitable wilderness areas (after suffi
cient resea rch, so as to avoid such
ecological disruption as that caused by
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burros in the Grand Canyon, mus
tangs in Wyoming and camels in the
California desert).
The fact that omnivorous diets are
ecologically destructive does not imply
that all vegetarian diets are ecologi
cally benign. It is, for example, eco
logically damaging to raise tomatoes
and pineapples monoculturally.
But
this does not diminish one's prima
facie obligation to be a vegetarian. It
means merely that being a vegetarian
does not discharge completely one's
prima facie obligation to reduce one's
negative impact upon and promote the
health of ecosystems. The obligation
requires (prima facie) that we alter
many aspects of our lives, in areas as
diverse as transportation, recreation
and fami Iy plan n i ng. But the poi nt of
the present paper is that we are
required to become vegetarians.
If the arguments above are cor
rect, I have so fa r shown that people
have a prima facie obligation to be
vegetarians, and that this obligation
is not overrridden by very slight
inconveniences to the agent.
I will
now show that except for those with
special health problems, people have
an obligation pure and simple, one
that is not prima facie, to become
vegeta rian s.
For healthy people, no loss in
nutrition or health need accompany a
change to a vegetarian diet.
There
will be some loss in gustatory pleas
u re, but th is need be no more than
temporary. Delicious vegetarian meals
can be made as easily, and often more
inexpensively, than the dishes they
replace. Thus, the major ob~tacle to
becoming a vegetarian is the trouble
associated with abandoning old pat
terns of behavior and adopting new
ones. Th is inconvenience is consider
able, but tempora ry, lasti ng on Iy a
matter of months, at most. If one can
remain a vegetarian for many years,
then the bu rden of becomi ng one is
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smaller per unit of time during which
one can be a vegetarian, than is the
ecological benefit per unit of time of a
vegetarian over an omnivorous diet.
This is because each day a person is
a vegetarian, the strain that his or
her food consumption puts on the bio
sphere is cut by more than one-half. 8
Because individuals differ, no one
can be certain that his or her long
term experience of loss wi II not be
very great.
But the testimony of
those who have al ready become vege
tarians gives everyone very good evi
dence that in the long ru n bei ng a
vegeta ria n involves very Iittleloss.
So everyone has an obi igation, wh ich
is not prima facie, to at least become
a vegetarian, and remain so long
enough for the formation of habits
that have for other people made vege
tarianism convenient and esthetically
pleasu rable.
The val ue of healthy ecosystems
does not diminish the value of human
well-being, so the consequences for
the general level of human well-being
of a massive shift shift to vegetarian
ism must be assessed. These conse
quences are mostly positive. It would
be easier and less expensive to feed a
vegetarian than an omnivorous popula
tion. Thus, we would all gain at the
supermarket.
More
important,
it
would be easier to eliminate malnutri
tion and
starvation among
human
bei ngs as n utritiou s food was pro
duced more efficiently.
(Of cou rse,
this does not by itself guarantee that
the poor would actually be fed.) The
improved ecosystems resu Iti ng from
vegetarianism could be of recreational,
esthetic a nd scientific benefit to peo
ple.
On the negative side, the meat
industry would be ruined, creating
ha rdsh ips for those who depend upon
it for income. There is however, a
general bel ief in ou r society that the
commercial
hardships
created
by
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changing consumption patterns are
more than compensated for by the
benefits associated with such changes.
Thus, we do not censure those who
are voluntarily buying small, fuel-ef
ficient cars, even though this creates
difficulties in the auto industry. We
do not look back with moral disdain
upon those who chose eighty years
ago to light thei r homes with electric
ity, rather than gas.
We have no
more reason to question the moral
propriety of a change to vegetarian
ism.
Indeed, we "have less, due to
the obviously great human benefits to
be derived from the change, and to
the fact that the change is called for
by the obligations to minimize the
ha rm one does to ecosystems a nd to
promote thei r health.
6. J. Baird Callicott, in his gener
ally excellent article "Animal Libera
tion: A Triangular Affair, "9 maintains
that the earth's biosphere is best
protected by people remaining omni
vores rather than becoming vegetari
ans. One's prima facie obligation to
reduce one's negative impact upon and
promote the
health of ecosystems
would thus require that one continue
eating meat.
Callicott does not dis
sent from the view urged here that,
all other things being equal, vegeta
rian humans are lesser burdens on the
biosphere
than
their
omnivorous
counterparts.
He notes,
however,
that vegetarianism
"increases
available
food
resou rces for human beings.
The human population would
probably, as past trends over
whelmingly suggest, expand in
accordance with the potential
thus afforded. The net result
would
be
fewer
nonhuman
beings and more human beings
who, of course, have require
ments of life far more elaborate
than even those of domestic
animals,
requirements
which
tax
other
'natu ra I
wou Id
resources' (trees for shelter,

minerals mined at the expense
of topsoi I and its vegetation,
etc.) more than under present
ci rcumstances.
A vegeta rian
human population is therefore
probably
ecologically
cata
strophic. "(emphasis in original)
The first thing to note is that the
a rgument here is not that general
vegetarianism would be ecologically
catastrophic, but that an increased
human population would be so, which
is of course correct. So Callicott is
not denying the ecological advantages
of the prescriptions that people both
stop eating meat and stabilize or"
decrease their population.
He maintains,
however, on the
basis of "past trends" (he might have
invoked Malthus, as well) that the
human population tends to expand in
accordance with the food available to
people.
Following the first prescrip
tion, vegetarianism, thus makes it
unlikely that people will follow the
second,
population
stabilization or
reduction.
But the Malthusian pre
diction is surely ill-founded. Contem
porary industrial and post-industrial
societies (i.e. Western Europe, Japan
and the United States)
illustrate
almost universally that an increased
availability of food, whether created
by altered agricultural practices or by
ag ricu Itu ral imports pa id for with
manufactured goods,
need not be
accompanied by population increase.
The populations in these countries are
either leveling off, stable or declining
slightly. Is there any reason to think
that if food became increasingly avail
able due not to increased agricultural
or industrial output, but because peo
ple became vegetarians,
that the
effect on population would be any dif
ferent?
I see none.
Quite to the
contrary, if people were so moved by
the ecological argument presented here
as to change their eating habits, the
last thing one would expect them to
do is apply the money they save on
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food to the birth and rearing of a
child they would not otherwise have
had. So the con nection between veg
etarianism and population
increase
upon which Callicott's argument turns
is factually ill-founded and psycholog
ically implausible.
Reliance upon a Malthusian assump
tion about human behavior is inappro
priate in an argument against vegeta
rianism for
yet
another
reason.
Suppose the assumption were correct,
that people could be relied upon to
increase thei r population so as to fu lIy
use their food production potential.
Twentieth
centu ry tech nology
has
made that potential so great that the
correspondi ng
popu lation
increase
wou Id be great enough to lead to
nothing short of world-wide ecological
disaster.
All roads W0U Id lead to
perdition. Whether people were vege
tarians or omnivores, whether indus
try were powered by solar energy or
nuclear energy, whether there were
disarmament or a continued armS race,
popu lation increase wou Id destroy the
biosphere.
The danger of ecological
disaster would, therefore, not serve
to favor anyone cou rse of action over
its opposite, and so would not favor
either an omnivorous or a vegetarian
diet over the other.
Thus, even
when his Malthusian assumption is
granted, Callicott does not present a
cogent argument against vegetarian
ism.
Finally, Callicott raises a consider
ation which does not so much argue
against vegetarianism as denigrate its
importance. He writes in relation to
the horror that an inial liberation ists
have of factory farming,
liThe land ethic takes as much
exception [to] (sic) the trans
mogrification
of
plants
by
mechanicochemical means as to

that of animals. The important
thing, I would think, is not to
eat vegetables as opposed to
animal flesh, but to resist
factory farming in all its mani
festations, including especially
its liberal application of pesti
cides, herbicides, and chemical
fertilizers to maximize the pro
duction of vegetable crops."
The ecological
perspective of the
present paper supports this call to eat
"organically as opposed to mechanico
chemically produced food," because
pesticides,
herbicides and chemical
fertilizers
damage
the
biosphere
greatly.
But this in no way dimin
ishes the moral importance, from the
same ecological perspective, of avoid
ing the consumption of meat.; Pres
ently, most of the meat consumed in
our society is produced by feeding
animals mechanicocheniically produced
grains.
Cutting these animals out of
the human food chain would therefore
drastically reduce the mechanicochemi
cal production of vegetables. Second,
current food production methods
methodS are
used, as Callicott notes, be~ause they
"maximize the production of vegetable
crops." Maki ng the transition that he
and I both advocate to organ ic vege
table production will result in a food
shortage unless the relative "ineffi
ciency" of organic farming is compen
sated for by some additional efficiency
elsewhere.
So long as the human
population is over two or three bil
Iion, wh ich mea n sin the foreseeable
future, vegetarianism will be needed
to create additional efficiency in the
human food chain in order to make the
transition to organic agriculture feasi
ble. So contrary to Callicott's view,
the importance of eliminating the
mechanicochemical production of vege
tables strengthens rather than weak
ens the ecological argument for vege
tarianism.

Peter S. Wenz
Sangarnon State University, Illinois
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